Michigan Law Review
Volume 99

Issue 6

2001

Applying a Legal Matrix to the World of Sports
Elsa Kircher Cole
National Collegiate Athletic Association

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Elsa K. Cole, Applying a Legal Matrix to the World of Sports, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1583 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss6/19

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

APPLYING A LEGAL MATRIX
TO THE WORLD OF SPORTS
Elsa Kircher Cole*

LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: How THE LAw CAN MAKE SPORTS
FOR FANS. By Paul C. Weiler. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 2000. Pp. ix, 351. Cloth, $29.95.

BETTER

The intensity of fans' love for sports is no modern phenomenon. In
ancient Rome, fierce rivalries existed between fans of the Red, Green,
Blue, and White factions in chariot racing. Even emperors had their
favorites. A foul in a race by a member of one faction could spark a
riot in the stands. Winning charioteers would have their busts dis
played in public places and were paid salaries far beyond that of the
average citizen. Juvenal complained in his Satires that a chariot driver
might earn 100 times more than a lawyer! The best drivers even
achieved free agency and could choose which faction to race for.1
The natural excitement in sports is hard to duplicate in any other
form of entertainment. The fast pace of most sporting events sets
pulses racing, shifts in leads accelerate the tension, and the knowledge
that the event has a finite time or distance limit heightens the drama.
One measure of how sport dominates our lives is the frequency of
sports metaphors in our conversations, particularly those sayings that
are shorthand for standards of excellence and esteemed virtues. We
talk of "stepping up to the plate" when we speak of showing courage
and strength of purpose in the face of adversity. We "raise the bar"
when we want to strive for further excellence. Even the apostle Paul
used sports metaphors to describe a life virtuously lived in the
Christian faith: "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race,
I have kept the faith."2
Today almost every paper in America, no matter how small, has a
sports section. Local television newscasts usually devote five to ten
minutes of their scant half hour to cover sports news, generally
through a dedicated sports reporter, although the rest of the news
*
General Counsel, National Collegiate Athletic Association. A.B. 1971, Stanford
University; J.D. 1974, Boston University.

1. The Glory of the Games, in WHAT LIFE WAS LIKE WHEN ROME RULED THE
WORLD: THE ROMAN EMPIRE, 100 BC-AD 200 Ch. 4 (Time-Life Books ed., 1997).
2. 2

Timothy

4:7 (Revised Standard).
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team is small in number. With the proliferation of hundreds of televi
sion cable channels, network executives are hungry for product that
will capture viewer interest, and sports provide a natural audience
draw.
The recent NCAA/CBS negotiations that resulted in a record $6.2
billion contract for the right to proadcast, inter alia, the Men's Divi
sion I Final Four Basketball Championship over an eleven-year pe
riod, is an example of the value quality sports events have in today's
media market. These media megamillions, along with those made
from commercial product tie-ins, fuel big time sports' controversies legal and moral. Neither fan loyalty nor player skill, but rather issues
surrounding money have propelled sports law (sometimes coupled
with entertainment law) into a separate legal discipline.
But for sport to maintain its exalted position, the leagues, associa
tions, and organizations that host sporting functions must run effi
ciently and fairly, and somehow grapple with the burdens that accom
pany fan devotion and large bestowments of money. Because the
value of sports for both the live fan and the one who never gets inside
a sports venue depends upon the uncertainty of the outcome of any
particular contest, the need for a "level playing field" for the contest
ants is primary. The most skillful player cannot prevail when the field
is fixed, and few will maintain interest in lopsided, unfair contests.
Professor Paul C. Weiler3 recognizes the importance of that concept in
the title of his book, Leveling the Playing Field: How the Law Can
Make Sports Better for Fans.
Weiler looks at sports with the dual lenses of a sports fanatic and a
lawyer. That he fails to look at them also through the eyes of an edu
cator is surprising. Although he is a university professor, Weiler fails
to acknowledge sports' ability to educate and teach life lessons. In
stead, Weiler focuses exclusively on sports as a business. In this light,
he is troubled by many aspects of modem sports. Prompted by his love
for the game, he uses his legal skills to find solutions to them, but his
answers are directed always toward improving the enjoyment of the
game for the fans.4
Weiler aims his book at the broad audience of sports fans, not just
academics or practitioners, to whom he recommends Sports and the
Law, the textbook he co-authored with Gary Roberts (p. ix). Indeed,
3. Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
4. While the focus on the fan is understandable when critiquing the world of profes
sional sports, Weiler's failure to distinguish between that and the intercollegiate sports expe
rience is disappointing. Fan enjoyment is not a guiding principle in decisionmaking at the
collegiate level. Rather, the integration of the student-athlete into student life and intercol
legiate sports into the educational mission of the institution is the primary goal. Weiler does
not address the subsidiary role of the fan in that milieu, nor does he explain how the educa
tional mission results in different decisions about the integrity of the game and what is ap
propriate morally.
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the ratio of facts to Law in Leveling the Playing Field is evident by a
quick look at the book's index. The term "antitrust" is referenced
eighteen times but the "New York Yankees" are referenced forty
three times. The Violence Against Women Act is mentioned once,
while the movie Jerry Maguire is discussed five times. The case that
exempted baseball from the application of the antitrust laws, Federal
Base Ball, although referenced throughout the book, is not in the in
dex at all, but "Federal Base Ball League" appears and has five cita
tions.
Although Weiler fills the book with details about the history of
litigation and labor negotiation in professional football, baseball,
hockey, and basketball, it may be a difficult read for his intended
audience of sports fans. Weiler faces the always hard task of explain
ing complicated legal concepts to nonlawyers. A careful reading by
sports fans will be necessary to understand the theories on which
Weiler bases his many recommendations of how the law should be
used to improve sports enjoyment for the fans. The non-sports fan
lawyer must search through a myriad of facts, and back and forth be
tween chapters, to find the legal concepts that Weiler uses as the
foundation for his recommendations. It is almost as though Weiler was
so eager to share his wealth of sports lore arid legal erudition that the
material poured forth in a stream of consciousness that later was or
ganized into topical areas.6
To avoid that same problem, this Review's headings correspond to
issues in the order that he raises them. Amateur sports issues will be
discussed first, followed by those of professional sports.
5

I.

MONEY AND COMPETITION

Weiler begins his work by introducing one of the themes that he
will revisit: how sport compares and contrasts· to the entertainment
world of the movie, television, and music industries. For example
Weiler claims that the public fails to recognize the law's involvement
with the entertainment industry, while its interaction with the sports
world is well known (pp. 1-2). Yet, this observation seems at odds with
the content of such popular publications as People magazine, and tele
vision shows like "Entertainment Tonight." The media is fascinated
with the drama legal encounters provide in both the sports and enter-

5.

Fed. Base Ball Club

v.

Nat'l League,

259 U.S. 200 (1922).

6. Furthennore, Weiler's pride in the number of Harvard Law School-trained lawyers
who have played a role in major sports negotiations or litigation is evident. He never misses
an opportunity to identify them as such throughout the book. At times he refers to the
school just as "HLS," which may be mystifying to the nonlegally trained sports fan at whom
the book is aimed.
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tainment worlds. A fan of a particular actor is as likely to follow the
actor's legal woes as a sports fan is those of his or her sports hero.
In contrast, there is validity in another of Weiler's introductory
comments about the differences between sports and other forms of en
tertainment. He states that sports need organizations, leagues, associa
tions, and conferences in order to provide the product of sport, while
there is no equivalent need for "joint effort," as that term is under
stood in antitrust law, to produce product in the entertainment world.
Thus, Weiler first introduces the reader to a discussion that will recur
throughout his book - a discussion of antitrust law. Intrinsic to sports
is the proposition that teams and individuals must abide by the same
rules of the game in order to have fair competition (p. 5). Weiler rec
ognizes that without this, contests will not be challenging to players or
attractive to spectators.
The courts, too, have been sympathetic to this need and have ex
empted this type of concerted action from the application of the anti
trust laws. In reviewing the activities of the National Collegiate Ath
letic Association (NCAA), the U.S. Supreme Court said in NCAA v.
Board of Regents:
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is com
petition itself - contests between competing institutions. Of course, this
would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the com
petitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed. A
myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, the number
of players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be
encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the
manner in which institutions compete.7

·

While Weiler correctly identifies this need, he chooses a poor example
in the NCAA's "restricted earnings coaches" rule8 to demonstrate how
such joint power can be abused (p. 3). The rule was intended to create
entry-level coaching positions and to maintain competitive balance
among college basketball programs- legitimate goals for the NCAA,
and certainly in keeping with Weiler's professed interest in leveling
the playing field. The rule was adopted in the context of cost-saving
efforts, however, which made it easy for the courts and critics to
analogize to price-fixing. Thus, although only a few coaches actually
had their compensation reduced by the rule and many entry-level jobs
were created, the courts viewed it as a commercial effort by buyers of
services with market power to jointly reduce their cost of purchasing a
7. 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
8. NCAA Bylaw 11.02.3, adopted by the NCAA's member institutions at its 1991 annual
convention, limited the compensation of a coach designated by an athletic department as a
"restricted earnings coach" ("REC" ) to $12,000 during the academic year and $4,000 in the
summer. Each sport had a cap on the number of coaches allowed, the last of which were set
aside for the RECs, e.g., the ninth through twelfth coaching slots in I-AA football, the fourth
slot in men's basketball, the third slot in women's lacrosse.
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key input, compared it to a monopsony cartel, found it illegal, and
permitted the award of extraordinary damages.
The case of Pete Gaudet at Duke University, cited by Weiler as a
victim of this "egregious" rulemaking (p. 3), actually illustrates the
way NCAA member schools sidestepped the rule, thus failing to level
the playing field. Rather than using the rule. to provide an opportunity
for an entry level coach to join the profession, as was intended, Duke
chose to keep all six of its highly paid coaches on staff and rotated the
"restricted earnings" coach position between two of its coaches. It
paid one of them the restricted salary and the other a salary higher
than normal so that over two years the two salaries would average the
same as was paid before the rule. It just happened that it was Pete
Gaudet's turn to be paid the lower salary the year he had to replace
the head coach due to health problems. The previous year and the one
following, Gaudet was paid more than his regular salary so that he did
not suffer any long-term financial consequences because of the rule.
While sports leagues' and associations' efforts to protect and pro
mote competition occupy a good portion of Weiler's introductory
thoughts, he also spends considerable time exploring some of the most
contentious of modern sports controversies. The next portion of this
Review discusses that portion of. the book.
II.

MAINTAINING SPORT'S INTEGRITY

A. Misconduct & Discipline: A Mixed Bag
While not the primary focus of Leveling the Playing Field, Weiler
spends some time discussing the integrity of sports. He begins by ex
amining the notorious misconduct by eminent sports figures, like
Latrell Sprewell,9 Roberto Alomar,10 and Mike Tyson,11 and the lack
of meaningful discipline meted out in their cases. He also decries the
lack of consistency in sanctions for misconduct across sports (pp. 1516). In response, he suggests all player suspensions should be served
during the regular season rather than the playoffs to ensure that the
punishment is actually borne by the player. who was guilty of the mis
conduct, instead of his team (p. 11), and that conduct against third par-

9. An NBA player who, in the midst of an argument, choked his coach and had to be
physically restrained. Pp. 9-10. Sprewell was suspended from the league for one year and,
upon reinstatement, was traded to the New York Knicks, where he has enjoyed success and
popularity.
10. A professional baseball player who gained notoriety for spitting in an umpire's face
during an argument regarding a disputed call. Pp. 10-13.
11. A professional boxer convicted of rape in Indiana and sentenced to a multi-year jail
term (p. 15).
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ties should be dealt with more severely than against fellow players or
coaches (p. 15).
These suggestions are valid and ones that the NCAA, for example,
seeks to follow in its infractions process. Because of student-athlete
privacy rights under the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act12,
however, unhappy fans often are not aware of all the facts, and they
decry the NCAA's decisions. This does not diminish the NCAA's ad
vantage over professional sports, which are unable to issue uniform
sanctions through a unified enforcement staff, infractions committee,
and appeals board. Such a framework allows the NCAA to compare
one student-athlete's misconduct with another's across different types
of sports, and to mete out consistent penalties for similar misbehavior.
If member schools are dissatisfied with the penalties handed out, they
can vote to change the NCAA rules to "decriminalize" the behavior
for all student-athletes. Professional leagues can only regulate within
their own bodies and thus must always be at a disadvantage compared
to the NCAA.
In addition, professional leagues, and colleges and universities who
deal with nonathlete students, are under more pressure to find the
quick fix to a misconduct problem than the NCAA. Weiler notes that
in order to reach a reasonable response to misconduct, sports authori
ties must take time to think through the complexities of the issues,
rather than react hastily to the public swell of emotion (p. 30). This is
difficult to do in our media-rich culture that thrives on controversy
and dispute. The disciplining authorities need to realize, as the NCAA
does, that the likelihood is that the public will have an imperfect un
derstanding of the facts, and any sanction chosen will be unsatisfactory
to some. Therefore, the sanction needs to be selected because it is the
right one, not because it will mollify the fans or the media.U

12. 20 U.S.C. § 1230 et seq. (1994).
13. The NCAA is able to insulate itself from media pressure by having sanctions for
misconduct determined by a committee of jurists and educators unassociated with the school
or conference where the misconduct occurred. Professional leagues lack similar independent
bodies to determine sanctions. Further, when application of the rules results in sanctions the
institutions believe are unfair, the institution can propose rule amendments and lobby and
vote for their implementation.
For example, during the 1999-2000 men's basketball season, the NCAA's staff dealt with
some men's basketball eligibility cases involving improper receipt of education expenses.
The student-athletes had received benefits, such as payment for tuition at a preparatory
school, from individuals who· were not parents or legal guardians or established family
friends, before they entered college. The student-athletes were required to repay at least
some portion of the expenses and were withheld from contests.
NCAA member institutions asked that possible changes be made to the preferential
treatment bylaws. As a consequence, a proposed bylaw change is now before the members
for a vote that would allow a prospective student-athlete to accept education expenses, in
cluding tuition, fees, room and board, and books, from individuals or entities who directly
provide the funds to the school the prospect is attending.
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B. Race and Disability
Weiler also expresses consternation over the treatment of racial
minorities and handicapped athletes in sports. He notes the small
numbers of managers, coaches, and highly paid management folk who
are black or minorities in sports. w:he.re a high percentage of the ath
letes are of color (pp. 20-23). This is a major concern of the NCAA as
well. Although the percentage of minorities in administrative positions
in the national office staff exceeds their percentage in the population,
this representation is not duplicated in the athletics departments of
member colleges and universities.
,
One only needs to look at the 2000 NCAA football season to see
the problem. At season's end, eleven new head football coaches were
hired in Division I. None were black, although the sport's student
athletes are 50% African-American. The NCAA can only use moral
persuasion to increase the numbers of minorities, and women, in
higher education athletics administration. If schools can commit time
and money to find and recruit talented women and minority athletes,
they should be willing to make a similar commitment to their athletics
staff.
In a similar vein, Weiler discusses the Casey Martin case and the
need for sports to be tolerant of disabilities that do not affect the in
tegrity of the game (pp. 27-30).14 He lauds the NCAA's treatment of
Martin, as it conducted a physical examination of him and determined
a cart was medically justified and did not present a competitive advan
tage (pp. 17-18). The appropriate questions to consider are what are
the essential features of the game, and whether an accommodation in
terferes with the integrity of the sport. Sport presents special difficul
ties in making accommodations because it is essentially a conservative
activity with set rules that are rigorously followed. Creativity must be
employed to convince those who have grown up playing a sport a cer
tain way to recognize that an accommodation can be made that will
not destroy its essential nature.15

14. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 30
(2000) . The case asks whether the Americans With Disabilities Act applies to the PGA rule
that requires golfers to walk the course rather than use a golf cart. Mr. Martin has an atro
phied leg due to Kipple-Trenauney-Weber syndrome. The Supreme Court should decide this
case by the end of June 2001.
15. As an example, I once had to advise an NCAA swimming rules committee on the
use of a wooden paddle strapped to the arm of a handless student-athlete. When concern
was expressed that the surface of the paddle would provide a competitive advantage, I asked
whether the paddle could be perforated to replicate the spaces between fingers so that no
advantage would occur. All found this an acceptable solution.
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Gambling

In his discussion of integrity, Weiler next deals with "the deadliest
sin in sports," gambling. He discusses the inconsistency between the
public's desire to keep sports pure from outside gambling interests
while simultaneously increasing legal gambling venues nationwide (pp.
43-46). Weiler notes the acceptability of gambling in today's society,
and tries to find a way to allow the moderate or casual gambler to le
gally bet on sports while still maintaining sport's integrity. He suggests
that the government issue licenses to gamblers that would allow them
to win, or lose, a certain amount each year (p. 49). While recognizing
that illegal gambling would still likely occur, he believes ninety-five
percent of noncompulsive gamblers would use such a mechanism,
withering away the illegal market (p. 50).
Unfortunately, Weiler's solution would not address the integrity or
moral issue of gambling in sports. College athletics has as its purpose
not just entertainment for the fans, but also the character development
of young people through the values gained through sports competi
tion. The NCAA has taken an active role in its education and legisla
tive anti-gambling campaign because of its concern over the increase
in gambling by college students.16 This is consistent with the aggressive
posture that college administrators have taken, after years of toler
ance, against hazing and binge drinking on campus. Compulsive gam
bling is the next big issue to be tackled by student-life professionals.
The NCAA considers a player who bets on his or her own game to
be an anathema to sport. Unlike the professional athletes that Weiler
claims are unlikely to come under the influence of the gambling mafia
because they are already so well paid, the college student-athlete has
limited resources and can more easily be trapped by debt and be
forced to throw a game or shave points to pay off debtors. The NCAA
knows that point-shaving scandals hurt the integrity of the game for
the players and fans, and they have long-term effects. Today the
NCAA's Final Four is the penultimate goal of the college basketball
player, but that is a fairly recent phenomenon. In the 1940's, the Na16. The NCAA's Position on Gambling, approved by the NCAA Administrative Committee on March 19, 1997, says:
The NCAA opposes all forms of legal and illegal sports wagering. Sports wagering has the
potential to undermine the integrity of sports contests and jeopardize the welfare of student
athletes and the intercollegiate athletic community. Sports wagering demeans the competi
tion and'competitors alike by sending a message that is contrary to the purposes and mean
ing of "sport." Sports competition should be appreciated for the inherent benefits related to
participation of student-athletes, coaches and institutions in fair contests, not the amount of
money wagered on the outcome of the competition.
For these reasons, the NCAA membership has adopted specific rules [Bylaw 10.3] prohibit
ing athletics department staff members and student-athletes from engaging in gambling ac
tivities that relate to intercollegiate or professional sports events.
Position on Gambling, Op. NCAA (March 19, 1997).
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tional Invitational Tournament (NIT) was the premiere college bas
ketball event, and the NCAA tournament did not have much status.
But the 1951 City College of New York's point shaving in the NIT
tournament for gambling purposes materially harmed the fans' faith in
that tournament and contributed, in part, to the ascendancy of the
NCAA tournament.
Weiler criticizes the NCAA's legislative efforts to prevent legal
betting oil college sports, asserting that it has had no discernable effect
on the multi-billion dollar bookie industry, and that it has made some
college students illegal bookies or runners (p. 48). Yet the concern
that allowing betting on college games will pressure players and others
to sway the events' outcomes is a real one. For example, for fifty years,
the only state that permits legal betting on sports, Nevada, forbade
gambling on its own state colleges and universities' teams, evincing an
understanding that legalized betting on college athletics can have a
detrimental effect.17
Weiler appropriately chastises the way professional sports leagues
have dealt inconsistently with players who gamble, whether on their
own games or otherwise. As with their reactions to other forms of mis
conduct, the commissioners often appear to be responding to fan emo
tion or media hype about an event rather than determining if the in
tegrity of the sport will be injured or the playing field made unlevel.
This phenomenon is further explored in Weiler's chapters on the
sports war on drugs and athletes as role models.
D. Drugs
.
In reviewing the professional leagues' stand on drugs, Weiler con
curs with its strong stance against the use of performance enhancing
drugs, but then notes the inconsistency in their position when they al
low Creatine, an amino acid compound, and Andro, an antibolic agent
(p. 76).18 There is no question that strong regulation is necessary to
prevent athletes from unleveling the playing field through the use of
nutritional supplements that contain products that artificially enhance
strength, endurance, and performance. The pressure to perform bet
ter, whether self-imposed or from one's family or teammates, is a
comment repeated over and over again by student-athletes who have
tested positive in NCAA drug tests. As Weiler points out, in a 1995
poll of aspiring Olympians, more than half said they were prepared to
17. Nevada recently removed the ban on gambling on its own colleges and universities'
teams when confronted with its hypocrisy in opposing the extension of that ban to all other
states' schools. That move, however, was clearly only taken to prevent the passage of pro
posed federal legislation to close the Nevada loophole in the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (1994), not because the problem does not exist.
18. The NCAA, on the other hand, bans Andro and does not permit its members to pay
for the use of Creatine by its student-athletes.
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accept dying from a performance enhancing drug in five years if it
would guarantee their winning a gold medal now (p. 77). In the face of
such pressures, the NCAA's mandatory drug tests appear warranted,
as well as its one-year ban from participation if a drug test proves posi
tive.
The sanctions imposed by the professional leagues for recreational
drug use are criticized by Weiler, again for their inconsistency. Weiler
correctly argues that violence against third parties, particularly
women, has historically been tolerated by the professional leagues
while recreational drug use has had mixed sanctions depending on the
state of the national war against drugs. He rightly criticizes higher
education institutions that have also tolerated student-athletes' vio
lence against others.19 These behaviors do affect the fans' faith in the
integrity of the game, but more from the concern of those who see
athletes as role models for young people than any direct impact on
sport.
E.

Maintaining Integrity

Having identified all of these moral behavior issues, Weiler does
not present any solutions for consistent sanctions by the professional
leagues beyond· recognizing the need for strong leadership at the
commissioner level. He notes that it is the owners who select the
commissioners, and that there must be public limits on such private
authority (p. 98), but does not provide a method to do that.
A model that would have been interesting for Weiler to explore
would have been one built on the principles of the international arbi
tration board. Such boards are now dealing with doping issues in in
ternational competition in certain sports. To have such a scheme work,
players and owners would have to agree on the value of a neutral
board of arbitrators that would evaluate proposed sanctions for mis
conduct and attempt to provide consistency across sports. The value to
be gained would be an enhancement of the sport's integrity, certainty
of punishment as a deterrent to misbehavior, and better disciplinary
decisions that are removed from the pressures of fan emotion and me"
dia hype. Weiler's thoughts about the efficacy of such a solution, the
practical barriers to be overcome, and a lawful method for creating
such an entity would be of interest to those who read this book.

1 9. The lack of an NCAA policy in this area of misconduct is a source of some confusion
for the public. NCAA member schools have chosen to retain control over student-athlete
misconduct ( and that of coaches and other athletic administrators) that does not impact the
integrity of the sport or provide a competitive or recruiting advantage by one school over
another or that does not occur in NCAA championship competition. Thus, the NCAA
would not have any authority to impose a sanction for a coach who struck a player during
the regular season, but would if the coach did so at a championship event.
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III. THE ECONOMICS OF SPORT
A. Money and the Leagues- The History of the Salary Cap
Weiler spends a majority of his space discussing the economics of
sport, the theme that consumes the latter .two thirds of his book. He is
bemused by the American public that ignores the high salaries paid to
entertainers like Tom Cruise or Oprah Winfrey, yet resents similarly
high salaries paid to athletes. Weiler explains this phenomenon as the
result of the fans' view that their favorite sports are a crucial part of
American culture, more akin to religion than to business, more a part
of American heritage than movies and television (p. 104).
The phenomenon also might be explained, however, by the atti
tude that sport is recreational, not serious work. Being paid to do what
most people do without compensation (and sometimes after paying
high fees for equipment and access to a sports facility) in their free
time for fun and excitement sounds to many weekend athletes as too
good to be true. In addition, it will always irritate those who see
worthwhile professions, such as nursing, social work, and teaching,
chronically underpaid for the value that they contribute to society.
Weiler lays the groundwork for his economic assessment of sport
by reviewing in his chapter entitled, "Show Us the Money," the history
of salary caps in basketball, football, and hockey and the lack of one in
baseball.20 Weiler sees salary caps or salary taxes21 as a legitimate
method to keep player salaries from destroying the equity between the
wealthy teams and the poorer ones. He applauds the NBA, which in
troduced the salary cap, for the balance struck in its current agreement
and predicts that, when the NHL's current contract ends in 2004, it
will be racked by labor battles caused by its soaring salaries and failure
to implement salary taxing or revenue sharing.
Baseball, however, comes in for the brunt of Weiler's criticism
about players' salaries. With only a soft salary tax in place, salaries
have soared. The result has been that the highest paying clubs are also
the best playing teams on the field (p. 117). Weiler is troubled by this
and explores in later chapters how this should be remedied.

20. Unlike the NCAA's salary caps on the pay of the lowest level assistant coaches in
each sport that were ruled illegal under antitrust laws, which laws salary caps are permitted
when they are bargained for by players and owners as part of their union's salary
. negotia�L

21. Under a salary cap, a ceiling is placed on the total amount of money to be paid to an
individual player, or alternatively, the total team payroll, sometimes calculated as a percent
age of the league's income from specific sources. Under a salary tax, a percentage of team
payrolls must be paid into a common fund that is then redistributed to the teams in the
league. For example, under baseball's 1996 agreement, there is a thirty-three percent tax im
posed on the amount by which the top five team payrolls exceed the sixth highest.
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In an interesting twist, Weiler tells how the salary cap in football
was actually sought by the players, not the owners. He describes the
absence of a meaningful free agency due to the players' collective bar
gaining agreement, which allowed for a team losing a free agent player
to be compensated for the loss. A labor strike to change the provision
proved unsuccessful because star players chose to cross picket lines
and play. The players again turned to antitrust law to try to sue the
owners to gain true free agency. Despite the players' attempts, the
Eighth Circuit ruled that the antitrust law could not provide relief be
cause the provision had been negotiated by the union with the owners.
The players then turned their union into a nonunion to sue the
owners under antitrust law. A suit by eight players was successful in
persuading a jury to conclude that the plan too greatly restricted the
players' ability to secure their fair market value off the field.22 Weiler
comments that when the lawsuit was expanded into a class action law
suit, the league commissioner settled it and other outstanding lawsuits,
providing a meaningful salary cap for the league, although the ulti
mate legal outcome was not a foregone conclusion (p. 109). It would
have been interesting for Weiler to explain this remark, because so
few of these salary cases go through the appellate process, preventing
the creation of a meaningful road map that could predict the success
or failure of such actions in the future.
In his exploration of the NBA, Weiler discusses how basketball's
biggest stars traditionally used antitrust litigation. On several occa
sions, players sued owners, alleging antitrust violations, when they dis
agreed on salary issues. This practice ceased when the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that, as long as players were part of a union,
they had no right to sue under antitrust law. Weiler explains that this
has led star players to try to decertify their union in order to sue the
owners under antitrust law. Specifically upsetting for the star players
was the imposition of a "luxury tax," which a team would pay to its
competitors when the payroll exceeded a designated cap. While
Weiler recites how this legal tactic made the owners back off and re
store the status quo, he does not fully explain why this threat was
deemed so severe by the owners that they would rather give in.
Weiler then goes on to discuss the history of salary caps in hockey.
Hockey originally had the same kind of free agency as did football;
that is, the team losing the player had to be compensated. A successful
strike gained hockey true free agency and salaries soared. When the
owners tried to impose a salary cap, the players struck again, and, un
like football, no top players crossed the picket lines. In the end, a sal
ary cap was only imposed on rookies, no salary tax was imposed, and
salaries rose stratospherically, resulting in franchises moving to larger
22. McNeil v. Nat') Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).

May 2001)

Applying a Legal Matrix to the World of Sports

1595

metropolitan markets. This leads to Weiler's prediction of a huge la
bor battle when the current contract expires in 2004.
Baseball appears to be Weiler's sport of choice and, therefore, he
seems more deeply troubled by its salary woes than in other sports.
Weiler explains that when the owners tried to impose a salary cap, the
baseball players were unable to sue under the antitrust laws, even if
they threatened decertification, as basketball and football players had,
because of an anomalous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1920s holding that baseball is not subject to the antitrust laws.23 The
players went on strike, eventually resulting in the owners announcing
a salary cap that was challenged in court. The players challenged the
owners' action because no impasse had been reached in the labor ne
gotiations. In light of his stated intention to write a book for the non
lawyer, sports fan, it would have been helpful for Weiler to explain the
labor law theory requiring an impasse, which would have helped the
reader better understand why that decision resulted in the players
ending their strike.
B.

Players' Continued Efforts to Organize

Having mentioned the role of players' unions in Chapter Six, it is
somewhat confusing for Weiler to then deal in depth with the history
of baseball, football, basketball, and hockey unions in Chapter Seven,
"Sports Joins the Union." Weiler describes the early organizing efforts
in baseball and how the lack of a competitive league made unionizing
efforts in that sport much less effective than in football, basketball,
and hockey, which all faced serious challenges from rival leagues in
the last forty years. Weiler points out that while the players distanced
themselves from the term "union" and preferred the term "players as
sociation," the organizing of players should be credited with the rapid
increase in athletes' pay.24 Weiler notes that it was the players' unions
focusing on the owners' long-time reserve systems that set off the sal
ary spiral that continues today (p. 120).
In Chapter Nine, "Opening the Flood-Gates," Weiler continues his
discussion of the legal challenges to salary restrictions that he began in
Chapters Seven and Eight. He finally explains the legal basis for Fed
eral 'Baseball's exemption of baseball from antitrust law: baseball is
not the type of commerce among the states that permits federal rather
than state regulation (p. 136). Such explication would have been help
ful back in Chapter Eight. He points out that the judicial inconsistency
in subsequent Supreme Court rulings that refused to exempt :football
and boxing from the antitrust laws did not prevent the. Court in Flood
23. Fed. Base Ball Club v. Nat'! League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
24. In baseball, for example, players' salaries escalated from four times the pay of the
average worker in 1947 to fifty-six times such pay in 1999. P. 1 19.
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v. Kuhn,25 which dealt with a player's challenge to baseball's reserve
system, from once again giving baseball immunity from the antitrust
laws.
From a lawyer's point of view, one of the most interesting stories
told in this chapter concerns the creation of baseball free agency.
Andy Messersmith, a pitcher for the Los Angeles Dodgers in the
1970s, on advice of legal counsel, refused to sign his annual contract
and played the 1975 season without one. At season's end, his attorney
took the matter to arbitration. He convinced the arbitrator that al
though the club had the right to renew the contract each year, the op
tion to renew the contract clause was one that had to be renegotiated
each year. He also successfully argued that to read another contract
clause as saying that the only club with whom the player could deal
was the one to which he was under contract or by which he was re
served was incompatible with freedom of contract in the economic and
political society in which we live (pp. 139-140).
This creative interpretation of Messersmith's contract resulted in
his free agency and the choice by more than half the players to play
out their options the next season. While a fascinating story from a
lawyer's viewpoint, Weiler is quick to point out that that alone would
not have opened the doors to free agency because the owners could
have rewritten the contracts to close the loophole. Buoyed by
Messersmith's success, however, the players raised issues of free
agency when their collective bargaining agreement expired and re
fused to allow such restrictive language to enter their contracts. The
players were further assisted by the economic leverage they gained
when the commissioner ended the owners' lockout of the recalcitrant
players. Weiler credits the development of free agency for today's high
salaries. He is eager to note, however, that the economic problems in
baseball are not caused by free agency but by revenue disparities be
tween teams in the smaller and larger markets.
Weiler goes on to describe each of the subsequent strikes in base
ball and the owners' collusion in the late '80s, in which they attempted
to halt the bidding for free agent stars. The end result was a flurry of
lawsuits and their subsequent settlement. The settlements incorpo
rated antitrust-type remedies of treble damages plus attorneys fees for
collusion. Weiler credits this background legal framework for a tri
pling of salaries in less than a ten-year period and urges the reader to
consider unionization of their own jobs and collective bargaining if
they want to duplicate the success of the players. Weiler then suddenly
introduces a new theme, criticizing the minor league system which al
lows owners to contain the cost of developing talent, while the major
league players continue to take the majority share of the available sal25. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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ary money. He suggests it is the players who need to be convinced of
the need for reform of this system.
C.

The Return of Antitrust and Its Uneasy Application to Sport

Having now brought all of these salary issues to the. attention of
the reader, including a discussion of antitrust law in Chapter Nine,
Weiler now confusingly returns to the antitrust law and effects on
players in Chapter Ten, "What Antitrust Did for Players." Weiler ex
haustively outlines all of the antitrust litigation that has occurred in
football, basketball, and hockey, which may be of surprise to the aver
age fan who associates antitrust law only with big businesses like
Microsoft. He shows how the combination of union strength, brought
about by emerging competitive leagues bidding for player services,
combined with the use of antitrust litigation, brought about reform in
the Draconian reserve system and introduced salary caps in those
sports.
It is at this late point that Weiler finally addresses an important is
sue for the non-lawyer fan to understand - that there is a labor ex
emption from the application of the antitn�st law. The fact that players
cannot use antitrust law to challenge restraints to which they con
sented in labor negotiations seems intuitive. The fascinating aspect of
the story, however, is the players' negotiation savvy. When courts held
that the players could not challenge such things as salary caps because
the union had agreed to their impositi�n, the players brought leverage
against the owners by beginning a decertification of the union. In short
order, the owners folded and the players achieved t.heir goals through
compromised settlement negotiations.
Weiler is unhappy with the current state of players' legal recourse.
When salary and benefits issues arise, the courts have ruled that play
ers must choose between a strike or antitrust litigation instead of being
able to use both.26 He points out there are many federal statutes that
protect workers, such as the civil rights acts, and workers do not have
to choose between enjoying the protection of those laws and their un
ion (p. 167). Of course, this argument ignores the fact that these fed
eral laws are imposed on the employers and employees alike, without
their consent, while the contractual. terms have been negotiated and
accepted by the parties. Why should the harsh treble damage penalties
and attorneys fees be available to contest what has been agreed upon?
Weiler answers that players unions are different than most unions
because the players want competition for their services while workers'
unions do not (p. 168). For most unions, competition drives down
prices, and so they are in favor of uniformity in wages. Weiler does not
further explain this phenomenon; however1 the variance in individual
26. Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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talent is so much more important in sports than that, for example, be
tween workers on an assembly line or meat cutters in a plant. The
unique services of professional players make competitive bidding for
their services a plus rather than a detriment.
D. Big Contracts, Bigger Controversy
Weiler accurately predicts the uproar in baseball over the $252
million, ten-year contract free agent shortstop Alex Rodriguez signed
with the Texas Rangers in December 2000, the largest ever in baseball,
doubling the previous contract record in a matter of days, as signaling
eventual catastrophe for the sport.27 In Chapter 11, "How to Level the
Playing Field," Weiler takes issue with those who decry such deals as
raising the ticket prices for fans.28 What really drives ticket prices, says
Weiler, is the economic well-being of the team, and that depends more
on the size of the television deal the team can strike, which depends
on the size of its city's television market (p. 184). Weiler says large sal
ary contracts only are redistributing the wealth by giving the players a
larger share of the owners' revenue (p. 173).
If Weiler is correct, these large salaries actually should provide a
benefit to fans, similar to what happened in college football when a
ceiling was placed on the number of players that could be on a team. If
a professional team owner uses up much of the team's available reve
nue to get a top ranked player, the owner will not be able to afford to
pay the salaries necessary to keep the second- and third-best athletes
who play that position on the team. That will encourage those very
good players to become free agents and go to teams where their talent
can improve the rosters of those teams. Likewise, when the NCAA
placed a limit on the number of college football players that a school
could have on its roster, certain coaches could no longer keep players
that only sat on the bench and never played just to keep them from
playing for any other team. As those players became available to en
rich other schools' teams, they eventually helped even up the quality
of the other teams in the conference and improved the competitive
quality of the game for the fan. In time, this should spread the talent
around and improve the competitiveness of the game for the fan.
27. "Contracts like this help us get closer to the days when we all go out of business. It
will take something catastrophic to change the system. As long as clubs are willing to lose
significant dollars in their quest to win, there is no end in sight." Mel Antonen, Contract Un
nerves Baseball Officials, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2000, at lC (quoting Gerry Hunsicker,
Houston Astros' general manager); "It makes [Major League Baseball Commissioner Bud
Selig's) job of bringing financial sanity to the game even more difficult, if not impossible. "
Hal Bodley, Rangers' Deal with A-Rod: Insanity, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2000, at 4C.
28. "Rangers fans might think this money is coming out of the owners' pockets when, in
reality, it's coming out of their pockets . . . . Tickets cost more, hot dogs cost more - every
thing about the game costs more. Everything is passed on. " Hal Bodley, Rangers' Deal with
A-Rod: Insanity, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2000, at 4C.
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MAINTAINING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

A. Making Sense Out of Money
If high salaries have not hurt the games for the fans, many believe
the use of free agency has. Weiler attacks this shibboleth with the
facts. As many players were traded by the owners before free agency
as have chosen to move afterward (175-76). Weiler also explains that it
is more myth than reality that free agency has hurt the quality of the
game. What has happened, Weiler argues, is that players are sharing in
more of the revenue that used to go to the owners. Ticket sales have
increased and television revenues have skyrocketed. That players are
being paid now what they are worth, Weiler argues, is substantiated by
the increased value of teams to owners and, Weiler says, to fans as
well. He illustrates this thesis by pointing out that after free agency,
baseball became the most competitive it had ever been, with fifteen
different teams winning the World Series over twenty years (p. 183).
Weiler notes that while there is substantial competitive imbalance,
some economically well off teams are choosing to reduce salaries due
to a distinctive phenomenon of the sports market - the fact that the
winner takes the lion's share (p. 186). Winning a championship boosts
attendance and television ratings for years to come, he says, and offers
tremendous gratification for the owners. This phenomenon is well
known in college sports as well. For example, Virginia Tech saw a
twelve percent surge in freshman admission applications in the wake
of its 2000 Sugar Bowl appearance. While school officials there do not
credit it all to football, they acknowledge it had an impact.29 Once a
team wins a championship, there is also increased pressure, Weiler
points out, to win again the next year. But other team owners do not
feel the same pressure; in fact, they may feel the opposite and sell off
their good players for future draft picks to build the team up over a
number of years. This results in a collective loss for the league as the
fans of the lowballing teams have inferior sport to watch, which can
result in a revenue loss for that team that can hurt the league more
than the superior team helps it.
Weiler sees a "public goods" aspect of the sports market in the
need to maintain a quality game for fans while still providing fair sala
ries for players. He believes that improvements can be made to the
current salary system in baseball. He also recognizes that another
baseball strike is possible when the current labor agreement expires
October 31, 2001. Others support that fear.30
29. Steve Weiberg,
2000, at Al.

Bowl Games Can Be Costly - Win or Lose,

USA TODAY, Dec. 26,

30. "Until some team actually goes under, the situation won't improve. The spending
will continue, and I think it's setting up another strike." Hal Bodley, Economist Concerned
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Weiler's solution is to have a league wide "payroll standard" (p.
189), rather than a cap or tax. The standard, he says, should be imple
mented in a way to provide each club with an incentive to invest up to
the level needed to build a competitive team, rather than to spend too
much on assembling a roster that is too strong or spend too little in a
roster that is too weak. He also advocates a meaningful graduated sal
ary tax, applied to the lowest salaries as well as the highest, and taking
into account the differences in state taxes rather than imposing a flat
tax.
It is difficult to evaluate Weiler's payroll standard because he does
not describe it in any further detail. As he often does in his text,
Weiler digresses into discussing some fact scenarios, which, while illus
trative of the current problems, do not assist the reader in easily un
derstanding how his solution would deal with those issues.
Having recommended a method for sharing of revenues between
players and owners in a way that Weiler hopes would provide a better
game for fans, he turns to his next subject in Chapter Twelve, "Salary
Sharing Among Players." The theme of this chapter highlights the
growing inequities between salaries. For example, in 1967, the median
pay of a professional baseball player was very close to the average sal
ary, and the top salary used to be twenty times that of the bottom.
Now, the median player makes less than a third of the average and the
top player makes seventy times the salary of the lowest (p. 198).
Weiler says this reflects the difference in salary rules for rookies ver
sus veteran players and those in between.
This situation, in what is apparently Weiler's favorite sport, base
ball, leaves him particularly unhappy. He argues that the draft should
be expanded to encompass foreign players and the entire array of
players from high school to the majors. He would limit the rounds in
the draft, as football and basketball do. Players not selected should be
able to sign with any club. A ceiling should be placed on rookie sala
ries at a minimum set for first-year players (p. 203).
Weiler understands the difficulty inherent in his suggestions. Major
league baseball clubs would not be able to reap the investment they
make in their farm clubs where they currently have first access to the
rookies they support financially. Weiler's creative solution is to have
the owners of major league clubs pay to minor leagues player devel
opment money that would have to be used to enhance minor league
competitive balance. In return, the majors could draft from the minors
without paying release fees.

USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2000, at Cl (quoting Charles R. Link, University of
Delaware economics professor); "These signings have raised the premium on figuring out
some way to level the playing ·field. It puts a great deal of pressure on upcoming negotia
tions." Id. (quoting Andrew Zimbalist, Smith College economics professor).
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B. Some Unanswered Criticism
Weiler's views on lifting draft restrictions for college students con
sidering professional sports careers are motivated solely from his posi
tion as a fan and what he believes is best for the sport, rather than his
profession as an educator.31 He ignores the value of a college educa
tion, often offered for free in return for participation in intercollegiate
athletics. He further ignores the fact that few high school students who
aspire to a professional career will actually achieve one.
For example, less than three of every 100 high school basketball
student-athletes will be good enough to play Division I college level
basketball. Of the 2,800 who have the skills to play at the Division I
level, there are only fifty rookie slots each year in the NBA. Thus, less
than two of every hundred, or 1 .8 percent, of collegiate basketball
players will make it to the NBA, and not all of them will have the
skills to last enough years to make it a career. To advocate changing a
system that seeks to integrate the student-athlete into the mainstream
of collegiate life and uses sports to teach life skills is very strange for a
person who has made a career out of higher education. The extremely
few outstanding high school athletes who made it professionally in the
major leagues do not make unfair a rule that emphasizes college edu
cation.32
C.

Spreading the Wealth - for Players and Owners

Weiler lastly addresses the need for more standardization in arbi
tration of salaries and proposes a formula to do so. He suggests that
the remedy to the tremendous disparity between the top salaries and
those of the journeyman players is to establish a maximum salary set
at about 10 percent of the team payroll cap. He says players will still
have an incentive to achieve greatness due to the emotional payoff of
leading a team to the championships and the lucrative endorsement
deals that would follow. Weiler states such caps can be justified by the
"public goods" dimension of professional sports; that is, the need to
improve and maintain a game of interest to the fans (p. 216-17).
Having spent the second third of his book on player salaries,
Weiler moves to his last subject, the owners. He begins by discussing

3 1 . "Golf certainly would not have been better off if the PGA Tour had told Tiger
Woods that he had to complete three years at Stanford before joining the Tour, nor would
tennis have improved if the Women's Tennis Association (WTA) had told Venus and
Serena Williams to get through college (or even high school) before turning professional." P.
209.
32. Weiler puts the term college "education" in quotes in his text, which demonstrates
his disdain for the initial and continuing eligibility rules college presidents have put in place.
The NCAA rules were promulgated to ensure that student-athletes truly receive a meaning
ful education.

1602

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1583

franchise free agency in Chapter Thirteen. He relates the story of the
Browns who used to play in Cleveland but were moved to Baltimore
by their owner when he was offered a better stadium deal. Weiler de
scribes several additional moves made by owners due to increasingly
attractive stadium situations, which cost cities in the hundreds of mil
lions of dollars. He decries the present situation that makes the owner
the winner in these relocations and suggests a "stadium cap" to re
place current stadium taxes, a proposition he spends the remainder of
his book explaining.
Weiler traces the origins of this stadium mania to the Dodgers
move to Los Angeles from Brooklyn in the late 1950s.33 The team's
owner wanted to own his own stadium, and Los Angeles obliged. Of
course, the city and the owner would have been thwarted, but for the
help of a court ruling that held that land previously acquired for public
housing could be used for the ball park because it served a public pur
pose. The owner built the stadium with his own funds and paid for its
upkeep.
The owner-built stadium has become an anachronism, Weiler ex
plains. Cities, and therefore taxpayers, have been picking up the spi
raling cost of more elaborate, sport-specific stadiums, whose life spans
have been shrinking (p. 244). As is typical of his confusing organiza
tion, Weiler promises at the end of Chapter Fourteen to examine
whether the investment in stadiums have provided increased economic
return to the community, but saves that discussion until Chapter Six
teen, meanwhile digressing in Chapter Fifteen to discuss how an
owner received a court ruling allowing him to move his team against
the will of the league.
The case once again involves the use of the antitrust laws and an
attempt to block an undesired action - this time brought by an owner
against a league. The Oakland Raiders claimed the NFL's refusal to
allow it to move from Oakland to Los Angeles was illegal. The appel
late court in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL34
found the NFL was a joint venture and that it had failed to proffer
procompetitive reasons for league control over franchise location.35
Thus, as Weiler points out, the door is not closed to a league subse
quently defending a decision not to allow a franchise to move. It sim33. This moment in baseball history has personal associations for me. My father drove
my family to Chavez Ravine the night of the opening game. There were no tickets available
for the game, of course, but it was exciting just to drive around the well-lit parking lot and
listen to the game on the radio.
34. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); see also City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985); City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983);
City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
35.

Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at

1395-99.
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ply needs to advance procompetitive reasons for its position. The
league, however, has chosen not to challenge other moves that have
taken place since then, resulting in fan misperception that no control is
possible over franchise free agency.
Weiler notes that the conventional reading of Raiders is that the
court was concerned about protecting competitive bidding by cities for
scarce teams. Weiler vehemently states that the result of Raiders is the
antithesis of what antitrust policy is all about. It has allowed the own
ers to reap huge financial rewards in the growth of their teams' value
at the expense of the workers and fans who must come up with more
and more money to attract a team to their city. Giving control to the
league will not solve the problem, Weiler notes, unless the leagues
base their decisions on what makes the most sense for the continuing
evolution of the sport based on fan interest and population changes.
Weiler states several times in the latter third of his book that $ 11
billion of taxpayers' money has been spent on new sports facilities in
the 1990s. He suggests in Chapter Sixteen, "Stadium Socialism or a
Stadium Cap?" that the only way to prevent such spending in the fu
ture is to pass laws that do away with the tax exemptions for interest
paid on bonds issued to finance these deals. Weiler believes in re
moving the 1986 Federal Tax Reform Act's ten-percent cap on sta
dium revenues used to repay the bonds so cities have the ability to ex
tract a greater share of the revenue from the team. He argues that
these bonds should be designated for "private activities," which qual
ify for tax-exempt status, a bond category for which the federal gov
ernment currently places a cap on each state. This would give state
voters the ability to decide if they wish to use the tax-free amount con
tained in the cap for that year on sports facilities or a different type of
public work.
Weiler then addresses a myth in sports franchising, that bringing a
sports team to town will result in economic growth to a region. While
he recognizes it may be a social boon to a city, Weiler puts forth facts
that explain that a sports franchise cannot generate sufficient revenue
to maintain a top quality sports facility. He argues the money would
be better spent for community recreation by building a public park.
He points out how few fans actually attend games and that big busi
ness often procures the best seats and boxes for its clients (p. 270-71 ) .
As a result, the average fan has little opportunity for the prime seat
ing. He explains why investing in attracting a branch of Wal-Mart to a
city brings a much better economic return to the community.
Weiler's focus on the economic return as the proper measure of a
sports franchise's value to the community is certainly a narrow per
spective. There are many other entities whose immediate economic
return to the community is slight, but make the city richer. This in
cludes many arts organizations, such as an opera company, a ballet, an
art museum, or a symphony orchestra, whose ticket sales do not cover
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their cost of operation and that are dependant on civic largesse to con
tinue to survive. Many people never attend any events sponsored by
these organizations, but their presence in a city make it a more desir
able place to live. Similarly, the excitement and camaraderie created
by a professional sports team is an intangible good that makes a city
more pleasant place to be and live.
D. Where the Money Comes From
Weiler raises the possibility of a stadium cap in Chapter Sixteen,
but then, in the manner that he has chosen to parcel out his solutions,
states that he will provide his remedy after he discusses other related
issues in the next three chapters. He then spends Chapter Seventeen,
"Sports in Intellectual Space," describing the monumental increase in
broadcast revenues over the last years of this century to be by far the
biggest financial feature of the sports world. Those familiar with the
NCAA's budget should not be surprised at this. Its contract giving
CBS broadcast rights to the Men's Final Four provides almost the en
tire budget of the association, the vast majority of which goes directly
and indirectly back to member colleges, universities, and conferences
to help fund their athletics programs.
Weiler discusses the legal underpinnings that give rise to a prop
erty interest in broadcast to the teams owners. His explanation of the
basis for merchandising rights is simply that consumers should not be
sold a product that they identify with their favorite team without se
curing and paying for the consent of the team's owner. Weiler criti
cizes the use of trademark law in this way saying, it has strayed far
from its original purpose of ensuring that celebrities did not have their
names and images used to convey the impression that they were en
dorsing the product (p. 287).
In this criticism, Weiler ignores a basic purpose of trademark law
- to prevent dilution of the goodwill built up in an entity's name. by
allowing it to be used by those who have not received permission to do
so. If the misuse of a name is not challenged, it will cease to have value
for its owner if anyone can use it at will. This seems ample justification
for application of the trademark law to protect a team's or player's
name.
Weiler then promises to discuss reforms in distribution of televi
sion and broadcast revenues, but not until the next chapter, "What
Should Leagues Be Like?" Weiler returns to the salary cap that )le ad
vocated in Chapter Twelve and then notes that leagues must consider
whether revenues brought in by one team should be shared with oth
ers.
This brings up the question of what a league is, he says. Weiler cor
rectly notes that a sports league is not a clear-cut single entity or a
joint venture as those terms are usually defined in antitrust jurispru-
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dence. He explores the arguments for considering a league a joint ven
ture and the pro-competitive reasons for its rules. He notes that those
that deal with the integrity of the sport should pass antitrust scrutiny
while those dealing with the market created by monopoly power are
the least defensible. He then cautions courts from being misled by the
single entity argument when examining decisions with a fiscal impact
on fans.
More revenue sharing in baseball, and less in football, is advocated
by Weiler. He supports each team having the right to sell its television
and marketing rights but believes the vast differences between teams'
revenue needs to be addressed. This would create parity in the type of
players that a team can afford, thereby ensuring fan enjoyment in the
game. Excessive sharing can have detrimental effects, he notes, be
cause owners will not grow the revenue source that they have to share
and will grow the others they can keep, which may not be in the inter
est of the fans.
In Chapter Nineteen, "Expand or Break Up the Big Leagues,"
Weiler proposes a dramatic solution to many of the problems ad
dressed in his book. He suggests that Congress should break each
league into three of four leagues with eight to ten teams in each. There
still could be a championship game, but the artificial scarcity of teams
that has driven up prices of sta�iums, tickets, and sports-affiliated
items would be eliminated (p. 328). Weiler advocates establishing a
meaningful standard to determine if a city should have a franchise, but
is silent on who would have the authority or interest in doing this. He
says that expansion would clearly add to the welfare of fans because
there would be more games to watch; it would benefit players because
there would be more opportunities to play; and it would reduce pres
sures on taxpayers to create more lavish facilities to keep or attract a
team (p. 319).
Weiler recognizes the huge political hurdles that would have to be
surmounted in order for such a plan to occur. Fans will first have to
appreciate the price they are presently incurring to preserve monopo
lies in sports, he says. His biggest concern is the survival of the new
leagues - would fans see them as major rather than minor league
teams and give them sufficient support in their initial years when they
would be more vulnerable to economic stresses?
In addition to the issues Weiler enumerates, there is also the ques
tion of whether there are enough exceptional athletes, coaches, and
trainers to support such an increase in major league teams. Addition
ally, there is the value intrinsic in a scarce resource. Once major
league teams become commonplace, will they still fascinate the fans or
will apathy ensue? Although Weiler does not discuss these issues, he
recognizes that enough exist that he ends up just endorsing the more
modest proposals he has made throughout his book.
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In the final two chapters of his book, Weiler synopsizes the myriad
of reforms that he has advocated throughout the text. Because he has
scattered his ideas among his chapters and has gone back and forth
discussing them throughout the text, it is helpful for the reader to have
these summarizing chapters as a way of finding all his ideas in one
place.
V.

CONCLUSION

Weiler clearly enjoys thinking about the issues in sports and ap
plying the matrix of the law to them as a disciplined way to find solu
tions. Because the issues are so complex, the fact-rich text makes fol
lowing his thoughts sometimes difficult. The diligence required of the
reader to track all of the factors playing a role in an issue through sev�
eral chapters and factual side trips makes it questionable as to whether
the average fan, without much knowledge of the law, will be able eas
ily to digest the information. The ones who stay the course will be re
warded with a thorough . analysis of today's current sports issues and
innovative solutions to them.

